**Economic Inclusion through Value Chain Development in Côte d’Ivoire**

**Progress Report 2021**

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*This report has been written at the end of the 2021 campaign for the rice pilot. It retakes the main point of analysis at this point. For a better understanding of the campaign in general please refer to the first and second progress reports. A monograph retaking the main analysis conducted on the pilot will be published and made available online.*

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# Pilot introduction

This report concludes the third year of implementation of the pilot *“Inclusion économique dans la filière du riz”* in Ivory Coast. It will summarize the key lessons and insights from the third year of implementation. It will include some of the quantitative analysis that is done on the data collected in the field to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the pilot.

The results presented in this report must be put in perspective with the lessons and evolutions of the program obtained during the previous two seasons. Thus, particular attention will be given to recalling the initial context of the pilot and its evolution over the seasons. However, for further information on the design and implementation, please refer to the previous progress reports [[1]](#footnote-1)

## Motivation

The “Rice Value Chain Development in Côte d’Ivoire” pilot aims to demonstrate proof of concept of an integrated approach to employment and income generation for the poorer segments of society in developing countries.

Understanding that markets do not exist for all the goods and services that beneficiaries can produce and to enable smallholder farmers to access more remunerative agricultural markets, this pilot includes several interventions along the agricultural value chain. As these interventions aim to address the different constraints faced by producers and buyers at the same time, it is commonly referred to as value chain development (VCD).[[2]](#footnote-2) These economic inclusion programs differ from other social protection interventions in that they combine social assistance (through cash or in-kind transfers or public work programs) with a host of interventions to assist the beneficiaries in developing income-generating activities.

Yet, with the integration of a multitude of simultaneous interventions also comes complexity which may in practice erode the potential synergies from integration. Through appropriate intervention design and survey control groups, this pilot tests the effects of such a joint approach on agricultural production and profits, overall household income and consumption, and food security. It also examines the synergies of offering cash transfer (CT) beneficiaries and access to markets through VCD, as well as the effects of CT or VCD separately. According to the cash transfer component of the pilot, the pilot is associated with the Côte d'Ivoire Productive Social Safety Nets (PSSN) project, which provides cash transfers to poor households in randomly selected villages in the northern regions of Côte d'Ivoire.

More particularly, the pilot develops this integrated approach to employment generation for poor rural producers in the context of rice production and cash transfers within northern and western Côte d’Ivoire. The reasons for this are multifold. First, more than 80 percent of Africa’s poor live in rural areas, earning most of their income in agriculture (Beegle and Christiaensen, 2019), justifying a focus on income-generating activities for the rural poor. Second, rising urban demand for rice in West Africa is increasingly met by imports, constituting a natural domestic market for import substitution. Third, rice is widely grown by smallholders in West Africa, though currently still mainly for auto-consumption. Fourth, cash transfer programs are increasingly becoming the intervention of choice for social assistance (as witnessed most recently in response to the COVID19 pandemic). These trends also hold in Côte d'Ivoire, where rice is considered a strategic crop. The lessons from the pilot can thus inform the expansion of the rice value chain in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as in the sub-region more broadly.[[3]](#footnote-3)

## Participants

The pilot VCD interventions consist of simultaneous support to smaller-scale rice processing units (PU, SME category) (which could be thought of as a labor demand-side intervention), support to smallholder producers (which could be thought of as a labor supply intervention) and support to a micro-finance institute (which supports the connection between the labor supply and demand side) to cover some of the additional transaction costs for the micro-finance institution arising from working with smallholder farmers spread across the rural space. The pilot intervenes in 3 regions (Tonkpi, Poro and Tchologo), selected based on the share of PSSN project beneficiaries already cultivating rice; the availability of an operating rice mill and the presence of a regional micro-finance institute branch and water availability for rice production in the region.

The rice purchasing contract between the PU and the producers stipulates the purchasing price and quality at harvest as well as the quantity to be delivered. It ties the different partners together. It forms the basis for obtaining input credit for the producers and the amount of working capital for the PUs after the harvest. All modern inputs and credit are provided on commercial terms. There are no direct input or credit subsidies provided by the pilot. Instead, the pilot focuses on facilitating interaction and establishing trust between the partners, to reduce transaction costs arising from coordination and contract enforcement which are expected to be particularly high at the beginning. The pilot also takes charge of the extension services provided to the producers and the technical assistance to the PU.

**PU -** The pilot works with one rice mill in each region that has the capability and ambition to play a catalytic role in developing the value chain. It focuses on rice mills with a processing capacity of 1 to 2 tons of paddy rice per hour (or 2000-4000 t/year). Support to the rice PUs consists of technical assistance regarding the technical and financial operation of a rice mill as well as rice marketing, as needed. Through the establishment of a collaborative partnership with the micro-finance institute, access to working capital for post-harvest rice purchasing is further facilitated. Lack of working capital is a common problem faced by smaller PUs, resulting in the underutilization of their milling capacity and investment capital. The pilot builds on this form of purchased paddy transformation for sale model through the development of contract farming of higher quality paddy rice permitting the PUs to obtain better margins per kg of white rice by supplying the more remunerative urban markets. During the 2021 season, the PUs emphasized the need for later repayment of their loans to benefit from better selling prices in the March-July period.

**Producers -** The pilot’s support to the producers consists of agronomic training to ensure higher yields of better-quality rice, facilitating access to finance by the same microfinance institute to buy inputs (such as seeds, herbicides, and fertilizers), and technical assistance to help the producers organize themselves in commercial interest groups around rice. The producers first open a bank account at the regional branch of the credit institution, and then they submit a loan request for input purchase. The inputs have been selected by the credit institution for the two first seasons and were selected in agreement with the farmers during the third season.

**Micro-finance institute –** the partnering microfinance institution is a local microfinance institute with branches throughout Côte d’Ivoire. The poorer segments of society are at the core of their clientele. It partners with the pilot to expand its presence in the agricultural sector and thus extend its reach to this clientele. Our program is designed with 6-month loans to the rice producers and extended loans to the processing units.

## Implementation

The pilot started its activities and first rice campaign in March 2019. The results of the first campaign and recommendations that emerged from workshops with the involved partners are described in the pilot's progress report dated June 12, 2020.

In 2020, the pilot entered its second campaign, with a few changes, based on the recommendations made at the end of the first campaign: (1) support for intensified rainfed rice production was discontinued, as it is not profitable; (2) participating producers were required to at least dedicate 0.25 ha of land to rice production; (3) lowland rice fields of interested producers were assessed to ensure they are suitable for rice production; (4) extension services were further strengthened; (5) simplified account opening and contracting procedures were introduced to gain time at the beginning of the campaign; (6) the representatives of the presidents of the village level GICs were invited to monthly partnership meetings to increase the producers' voice and participation; and (7) the PU in Tonkpi was replaced with a new PU that shared the vision of the piloting team on producing high-quality white rice for the local market.

The results of the second campaign and recommendations that emerged from workshops with the involved partners are described in the pilot's progress report dated July 5, 2021.

Finally, in 2021, the third round of the pilot has been implemented retaking the insights of the two previous rounds and introducing novelties: (1) participating producers were required to at least dedicate 0.5 ha of arranged low-land to rice production; (2) “blank account” opening and the mobilization of the credit agents directly in the villages were introduced to gain time and increase participation; (3) a guarantee deposit has been imposed to the producers before providing them with credits; (4) the training provided to the producers has focused only the cultivation process and the theoretical part has been cancelled; (5) a quality price premium has been introduced as an RCT in 50% of the participating villages, it has been accompanied by a special measure of the quality of rice produced by participants and non-participants in the pilot project; (6) the PU of the region of Tchologo has not conducted his mission due to over-indebtment.

The results of the 2021 campaign will highly contribute to the redaction of a monograph in which the finding of the three years will be summarized. Our lessons follow from regional workshops held in each of the three regions of intervention at the end of the 2021 campaign in March 2021, followed by a national workshop held virtually with all key stakeholders.

In what follows, Section 4 reviews the key findings from the quantitative analysis of the administrative data making a comparative analysis across years. Section 5 reviews the effects of the novelties introduced in 2020 and 2021. Section 6 resumes the lessons we get from the workshops. Finally, Section 7 presents the analysis that will compound the monograph concluding the three years of implementation of the rice pilot in Ivory Coast. These are followed by Annexes which give further information on the pilot and its implementation arrangements.

# Review of the 2021 Campaign

## Participation

**The number of participants has largely decreased in the 2021 season in comparison with the two previous ones.** We counted 137 participants in 2021 (compared with 458 in 2020 and 376 in 2019) among which 61 have also participated in the 2020 season and 11 in both previous seasons. Our participants were distributed in 20 villages among which 14 have participated in 2020 and 4 in the two previous seasons. Our villages of intervention are in the three historical regions in which the pilot takes place (Poro, Tonkpi and Tchologo) and two of the new villages were part of the administrative region of Hambol. Due to its proximity with the Tchologo, it has been conducted as villages of Tchologo and will be analyzed as such. In this third season, the beneficiary producers of the national cash transfer (*Projet Filets Sociaux Productifs*) represented 9% of our population (28% in 2020 and 44% in 2019 when the original selection was made).

The decrease in the number of participants has two major identified causes. First, the lower willingness of producers to participate in the pilot project this year due to bad experiences in previous seasons. Second, the increased requirements to participate as defined earlier. We will come back to this in Section 4 on the adaptation of the pilot since the first season.

Table 1: Participation across the three years of the program

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Number of participating villages *(2020‘s participants / 2019’s)* | 52 | 60*(15)* | 20*(14/4)* |
| Number of PFSF eligible villages *(2020’s / 2019’s)* | 25 | 26*(15)* | 3*(3/2)* |
| Numbers of participating producers *(2020‘s / 2019’s)* | 541 | 458*(88)* | 137*(61/11)* |
| Number of producers recipients of the PFSP *(2020‘s / 2019’s)* | 239 | 131*(47)* | 13*(8/1)* |
| Date: 11/03/2022 |  |  |  |

**For the season 2021, the regions of Poro and Tchologo count 7 villages with 1 first-time participant while the region of Tonkpi counts 6 villages including 3 first-time participants.** This is important for three reasons. First, because new participating villages have received less agricultural training. Second, it also impacts the number of participants which is about half that of the Tchologo region. Finally, the new participants in this region belong to experimented villages presenting better quality land and previous experience in rice commercial activities. It appears that the main interest for them in joining the pilot is to facilitate their access to credit.

Table : Regional participation in 2021

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Poro | Tchologo | Tonkpi |
| Number of participating villages  | 7*(6/2)* | 7*(6/2)* | 6*(3/0)* |
| Number of villages beneficiaries of PFSP | 1*(1/1)* | 2*(2/2)* | 0 |
| Number of participating producers | 48*(14/6)* | 58*(38/5)* | 31*(9/0)* |
| Number of producers beneficiaries of PFSP | 3*(1/3)* | 10*(7/5)* | 0 |
| Date: 11/03/2022 |  |  |  |

## Contracted land

**The total amount of land contracted has decreased in the 2021 season in comparison with the two previous ones but the average** **surface under contract per producer is constant during the three years around 0.7 ha.** The decrease in the total surface of land registered in the pilot is largely due to the reduction in the number of participants. However, with respect to the average surface of land per producer, we imposed a minimal size of land to participate in the pilot. (0.25 ha of low land in 2020 and 0.5 ha of lowland in 2021).

Table : Distribution of land across seasons

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Number of producers exploiting a low land | 376 | 458 | 137 |
| Total surface of low land contracted (ha) |  |  | 129.3 |
| Total surface of low land (ha) | 251,3 | 267,2 | 101.3 |
| Average surface contracted (ha) |  |  | 0.95 |
| Average surface per producer (ha) | 0,7 | 0,6 | 0,7 |
| Date: 11/03/2022 |  |  |  |

**For the 2021 season, we observe regional heterogeneity in the amount and distribution of land contracted.** The region of Tonkpi, which present the lowest number of participants during this season, presents the higher average surface per producer. Even if this result is partly driven by one producer presenting 5ha of low land, the average size of plots is still higher (0.9 ha) than in the other regions excluding the extreme value. The region of Poro presents the lower average surface per producer reaching only 0.5 ha.

As explained previously, the new villages integrated in Tonkpi for the 2021 season were already used to grow rice for commercial purposes. This explains the larger plots cultivated but also the better quality of the land.

Table : Distribution of land across regions in 2021

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Poro | Tchologo | Tonkpi |
| Total surface of low land contracted (ha) | 28.8 | 51.3 | 49.1 |
| Total surface of low land (ha) | 24,1 | 44,6 | 32,6 |
| Average surface land contracted (ha) | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.5 |
| Average surface per producer (ha) | 0,5 | 0,73 | 1,0 |
| Date: 11/03/2022 |  |  |  |

## Contracted volume and credit uptake

**During the 2021 season, the total commitment and the commitment per hectare have decreased in comparison to the previous seasons.** Accordingly, the total commitment to rice has lowered by 80% compared to 2020. An interesting point is that the average commitment per hectare has also largely decreased in comparison to the previous seasons. At this stage, we can propose potential explanations. First, the producers are more cautious about their production capacity. Second, the producers choose to deliver a lower part of their production to the program and keep a larger part for their own consumption.

**During the 2021 season, the amount of credit per hectare of lowland has evolved from 113 thousand FCFA in 2020 to 137 thousand FCFA in 2021. The cost associated per hectare has also increased in comparison to 2020 (from 12,352 FCFA/ha to 23,848 FCFA/ha).** As described in the following section, this increase in the cost of credit is associated with the introduction of the ‘guarantee deposit’ of 10% of the amount of the credit.

Table : Rice commitment and credit across seasons

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Contractual sales commitments for paddy rice (t) | 474.1 | 601.0 | 124.4 |
| Average contractual sales commitments for paddy rice (t/ha) | 1.9 | 2.24 | 1.25 |
| Total amount of credit granted to producers(Million FCFA) | 39,7 | 30,2 | 13,9 |
| Average amount of credit granted per producer (FCFA) | 105 507 | 110 381 | 108,836 |
| Average amount of credit granted per hectare of lowland (FCFA/ha) | - | 113,023 | 137,216 |
| Total cost of credit (FCFA) | 3 119 243 | 3 300 613 | 2 415 843 |
| Average cost of credit per producer (FCFA) | 8 295 | 7 207 | 18 874 |
| Average cost of credit per hectare of low land (FCFA/ha) | - | 12,352 | 24,400 |
| Date: 11/03/2022 |  |  |  |

In 2021, the commitment per hectare is varying largely between regions, from an average of 1.8 t/ha in Poro, 1.3 t/ha in Tonkpi and 0.8 t/ha in Tchologo. The average credit per hectare does not follow this distribution as it is higher in Tonkpi (reaching 146k FCFA/ha) than in Poro (141k FCFA/ha) and Tchologo (130k FCFA/ha). Finally, the average cost of the credit per hectare follows the opposite trend. Tchologo presents the higher credit cost per hectare (30,438 FCFA/ha), followed by Poro (22,194 FCFA/ha) and finally Tonkpi (16,355 FCFA/ha).

An explanation already revealed in 2019 and 2020 is that the (semi-)fixed costs (‘Account opening’ and ‘Application’ fees) are unfavorable to small producers. This explains the strengthening of the minimum surface required to access the program.

Table : Rice commitment and credit across regions in 2021

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Poro | Tchologo | Tonkpi |
| Contractual sales commitments for paddy rice (t) | 44.4 | 37.9 | 42.4 |
| Average contractual sales commitments for paddy rice (t/ha) | 1.8 | 0.8 | 1.3 |
| Total amount of credit granted to producers (Million FCFA) | 3.4 | 5.8 | 4.7 |
| Average amount of credit granted per hectares (k FCFA/ha) | 141 | 130 | 146 |
| Average amount of credit granted to producers (FCFA) | 87 690 | 99 404 | 153 089 |
| Total cost of credit in FCFA | 534 892 | 1 357 575 | 523 376 |
| Average cost of credit per hectares (FCFA/ha) | 22,194 | 30,438 | 16,355 |
| Average cost of credit per producer in FCFA | 13 715 | 23 406 | 16 883 |
| Date: 11/03/2022 |  |  |  |

## Agricultural production

**The 2021 season denotes with the two previous ones as it presents higher agricultural results. Agricultural production has largely increased across time (+1,5 t/ha on average between 2019-2021). In 2021, 52% of them have a yield over 2,5 t/ha and only 10% of the producers have a yield below 1 t/ha.** We also note a large decrease in the number of null productions: 18% (71/376) in 2019, 13% (64/458) in 2020 and only 3% (5/137) in 2021.

Considering that the sustainability rate is between 2 and 3 t/ha, this last season corresponds to the scale we are expecting. Unfortunately, we observe that during the three years of implementation, the proportion of the quantity of rice sold over the quantity harvested has largely decreased. Across the three seasons, we respectively had 72%, 53% and 44% of the total harvest sold.

Table : Agricultural outputs across seasons

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Amount of paddy rice harvested (t) | 277,7 | 343,0 | 279,2 |
| Amount of paddy rice sold (t) | 201,7 | 182,7 | 124,2 |
| Average yield (kg/ha) including zeros | 1 213 | 1 370 | 2 696 |
| Average yield (kg/ha) excluding zeros | 1 353 | 1 572 | 2 778 |
| Date: 11/03/2022 |  |  |  |

**As described before, during the 2021 season, the average quantities committed per hectare were heterogeneous among the three regions. In Tonkpi, 79% of engagement has been finally delivered, for comparison, the commitment rate was 90% for Poro and 131% for Tchologo**. **This does not conclude that the producers are unable to estimate their production before the season. Indeed, looking at the amount harvested, the region of Tonkpi has produced 215% of the quantity committed, 290% for Tchologo and 175% for Poro.**

Even if Tonkpi presents higher agricultural results, possibly due to the integration of experimented farmers in the program, all the three regions present agricultural results expected to reach sustainability. The failure to meet commitments during the 2021 season is mainly due to the low quantities sold by producers. This performance is disappointing for PUs that are unable to make a profit by working with low quantities of rice. During the regional workshops, different reasons for the difference between the amount harvested and the amount sold, among which we have: (a) the reimbursement of informal loans (up to 55% of annual interest); (b) the payment of the plot location; (c) the auto consumption (inside and outside the household); (d) other commercial choices such as selling to other buyers or the conservation of rice for speculation or saving.

Table : Agricultural outputs across regions in 2021

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Poro | Tchologo | Tonkpi |
| Contractual sales commitments for paddy rice (t) | 44,4 | 37,9 | 42,4 |
| Contractual sales commitments per hectare (t/ha) | 1.8 | 0.8 | 1.3 |
| Amount of paddy rice harvested (t) | 78,1 | 110,2 | 90,9 |
| Amount of paddy rice sold (t) | 40,4 | 50,0 | 33,8 |
| Average yield (kg/ha) including zeros | 2 692 | 2 523 | 3 028 |
| Average yield (kg/ha) excluding zeros | 2 749 | 2 661 | 3 028 |
| Rice price per variety in FCFA/kg (B-AM/JT11/C26) | -/165/165 | 140/165/165 | 150/150/- |
| Date: 11/03/2022 |  |  |  |

## Credit reimbursement

**The 2021 season presents encouraging results relative to the sustainability of the program. The two first seasons were characterized by very low rates of reimbursement. However, as we have seen in the previous subsections, the 2021 season has presented better agricultural results and thus a higher rate of reimbursement.**

Table : Credit reimbursement across seasons

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Number of producers having reimbursed  | - | 213/458 | 112/128 |
| Average amount of positive balances in COOPEC (FCFA) | - | 42 357 | 62 080 |
| Average amount of negative balances in COOPEC (FCFA) | - | 46 193 | 49 733 |
| Date: 11/03/2022 |  |  |  |

At the regional level, the rate of default does not present much heterogeneity. We must note that a village in Tonkpi did not ask for the credit but participated in the pilot, receiving only training and inputs.

Yet the producers have almost completed all their reimbursement for the season 2021, the reimbursements are still followed for the 2019 and 2020 campaigns. Indeed, the reimbursement process had to be adapted across years to fit with the field constraints. In the original design of the pilot, the process of payment was centralized at the level of the credit institution. The PUs were expected to receive the rice from the producers and send orders of payments to the credit institutionthat would take charge of crediting directly the producers' accounts. However, during the two first seasons, the transmission of orders of payments from the PU to the credit institution was made too late. Producers were considered late on the repayment of their 6-month loan, even if they had already delivered the quantity of rice necessary for the reimbursement. Thus, to facilitate the payment of producers, the payment procedure has been modified for the 2021 campaign. PUs were asked to pay any extra amount than the one needed to repay the producer credit directly to the producer in cash.

Table : Credit reimbursement across regions in 2021

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Poro | Tchologo | Tonkpi |
| Number of producers having reimbursed in 2021 | 33/39 | 54/56 | 30/31 |
| Amount still to reimburse for 2021 (FCFA) | 190,545 | 289,546 | 41,000 |
| Amount still to reimburse for 2020 (FCFA) | 2,514,561 | 5,117,717 | - |
| Amount still to reimburse for 2019 (FCFA) | 5,221,610 | 3,105,398 | - |
| Average amount of positive balances in COOPEC (FCFA) | 95 374 | 61 978 | 25 550 |
| Average amount of negative balances in COOPEC (FCFA) | 30 473 | 60 523 | 79 382 |
| Date: 11/03/2022  |  |  |  |

## Processing Units

**The 2021 campaign was characterized by low performance and the lack of working capital for PU in all regions.** In Tchologo, it was due to a lack of activity management and the late reimbursement of 2020 credit. It led to the renouncement of the PU in this region. The paddy rice has been bought at the contractual price and sold for 200 FCFA/kg by the local branch of credit institution. In Poro, the lack of working capital was due to the non-reimbursement of the 2019-2020 credit even after a restructuring of credit. In Tonkpi, it was due to the excessive rigidity of credit conditions during the season 2020.

As described in the previous sub-section, the PU have two types of payment to execute. The firsts are directly due to the producers' bank accounts. The seconds are needed to reimburse the PU loans.

Table : PU reimbursement situation

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Poro | Tchologo | Tonkpi |
| Number of producers still to be paid  | 0 | 0 | 14 |
| Amount still to reimburse to producers (FCFA)  | 0 | 0 | 2,545,200 |
| Total amount to pay to producers (FCFA) | 2,751,375 | 8 130 175,0 | 5,075,550 |
| Working capital to reimburse to COOPEC (FCFA) (excludes the cost of the loan) | 50 million | 23 million | 14 million |
| Date: 11/03/2022 |  |  |  |

In Tonkpi, 14 producers in 4 villages have yet to be paid by the PU. This corresponds to an amount of 2.5 million FCFA remaining out of a total of 5 million FCFA and the payments should be completed by April 2022. In Poro, the PU has paid in cash all the amounts exceeding the reimbursements that the producers had to make to the credit institution. Finally, in Tchologo, the PU was not involved in the purchase of rice, and no payments from it to producers' accounts are expected for the 2021 season.

As mentioned, the PUs still have to repay their working capital loans. In all three regions, these loans were taken out in the first season and were repaid in the 2020 season. The amounts to be repaid amount to 50 million FCFA in Poro, 23 in Tchologo and 14 million in Tonkpi.

## Conclusion on the results presented

**The main conclusion we get from this part is that the 2021 season seems to be much closer to commercial sustainability than the two previous ones.** However, this success is partial, and some (new) challenges must be overcome.

1. **Participation**
	1. **The reinforcement of the conditions of participation has led to potentially sustainable results from producers. However, it also reduced the number of potential participants.** The success of the third year of the pilot must be put in perspective with a potential up-scaling of the pilot to reach a larger population. It demonstrates a trade-off between the reduction of the risk associated with the pilot and the range of influence it can have.
	2. **The pilot has faced a problem of mistrust among potential participants** which also contributed to the reduction in the number of effective participants. This issue has affected previous participants to the pilot that had bad experiences with receiving their payment. It also affected potential new participants that have been wrongly informed about the conditions of credit and reimbursement.
2. **Commitment**
	1. **The observed level of commitment has decreased in comparison to previous seasons and is heterogeneous among regions.** We proposed two potential explanations for this. The less likely is that producers were more cautious in prevising their production. The most probable is that they preferred to commit a small amount to the pilot to direct the rest of their production to other activities (auto consumption, gifts, informal credit reimbursement).
	2. **The quantity produced is largely above the commitment quantity; on the inverse, the quantity sold is on average slightly below the commitment quantity.** This is particularly true in Tonkpi, where farms are larger on average, have experience in growing commercial rice and show higher agronomic results than the two other regions.
	3. **Low commitment quantities do not allow the PU to reach profitability. However, they are not the only factor in the non-sustainability of their exploitation.** As presented in the corresponding part, the PU face organizational constraints that do not allow the proper functioning of the pilot design. The remaining question is how to select the PU to allow the good functioning of the pilot and thinking of a scaling-up.
3. **Credit**
	1. **The producers’ costs of credits have largely increased between 2020 and 2021** **and** **appear to be unfavorable to smaller producers**. This is due to the (semi-)fixed costs (‘Account opening’ and ‘Application’ fees) and justifies the minimum surface of lowland to participate in the pilot.
	2. **The credit union justifies additional costs by the fact that it takes care of most of the risk associated with the pilot and proposes small interest rates.**
	3. **The PUs present high levels of indebtment and low results. They do not allow the proper functioning of the pilot credit design**. By not reimbursing their credit and then by not transmitting the orders of payment to the micro-finance institute in time, they put producers in late payment impeaching the subscription of new credit.

## Results of operational change conducted since 2019

## Land selection (Season 2020 and 2021)

**The 2021 season, as the precedent, has focused on low-land plots suitable for rice cultivation.** First, the producers were asked to present low land plots of size above 0.25 ha in 2020 and 0.5 ha in 2021. Second, under the selection of the Pilot Committee (comprised of the WB’s regional coordinator, the microfinance institution’s credit agent, and the PU’s producer liaison agent), the plots were checked to verify sustainability conditions. A lowland was deemed to be favorable to rice cultivation if the following conditions were verified: non-floodable lowland with clay texture, non-floodable lowland with clay-sandy texture (predominantly clay), or lowland with basic development.

**The plot cultivated during the 2021 season presents good characteristics for rice cultivation** and it explains partly why this season presents better agronomical results than the two previous ones. Particularly, among the new villages introduced, we find optimal characteristics of land and irrigation. This contributes to the success of their agricultural season. According to this success in land selection, the first module of training associated with it has been removed.

## Accounts opening directly in the village and “Blanks” accounts (Season 2021)

**In 2021, an agent of credit has been mandated to go before the beginning of the season to each village to facilitate and encourage account openings.** This measure was positively received by participants as it reduced the costs of account opening previously supported by producers. The meeting with the credit agent also increased their confidence in the credit institution and awareness of credit conditions.

**Following the same objective, accounts exempt from opening fees ("blanks") were proposed to new participants since 2019.** The fees were to be paid at the end of the season and at the beginning of the following season if needed. This measure was well received among new participants as they reduced the entrance costs. The "in-village" account opening, contributed to encouraging participation among producers.

## Guarantee deposit (Season 2021)

**At the beginning of the 2021 season, we have demanded the farmers willing to obtain a credit to deposit 10% of their credit on their bank accounts.** For the microfinance institute, it encourages repayment but also reduces the losses associated with credit default. This measure has been contested by producers and some presidents of the GICs as it directly contributes to increasing the cost of credit.

## Quality price premium (Season 2021)

**By November 2021, half of the participating villages were selected to benefit from a price premium of 15 FCFA per kg of premium quality rice sold to the program.** Following a strict evaluation procedure, the premium was paid for rice with 12 to 14 percent humidity, impurity below 0.3% included, and fermentation below 3%. This measure has been positively received by the farmers and the PUs. It also presents primary encouraging effects. From the regional workshops, some farmers even proposed to introduce a poor-quality penalty to encourage producers to increase the quality of their rice. However, many questions remain on the sustainability of such a premium due to the implementation costs and the necessity of relying on a trusted and impartial evaluation of the quality.

## Renewal of the training modules (Season 2021)

**In 2021, the training was focused on the practical part excluding the theoretical considerations.** In 2020, each module was composed of a theoretical part in the morning and a practical application in the evening or the next day. In 2021, theoretical part has been removed and lessons were only concentrated on half-days.

**The total training time per village has remained unchanged. However, in 2021, the module on land selection and primary preparation were removed. Furthermore, the training particularly insisted on the importance of rice quality during this season.** The corresponding time has been used to double the time associated with the module "setting up of rice cultivation”. The last module on harvest and post-harvest practices has been maintained from 2020.

**A new part of the training has been individualized at the plot level. The agricultural extension agents were asked to visit the plots multiple times and provide specific advice.** According to regional workshops, the effects of this operation have been multiple. First, field visits by agricultural instructors have resulted in more accurate and farm-specific agricultural advice. Secondly, the individualization of the visits affected the involvement of the farmers who felt supervised. This measure has been globally appreciated by farmers.

# Lessons for a follow-up campaign

The exchanges obtained during the different workshops have contributed to the analysis of the previous points. The following part will underline the issues raised during the regional and national workshops. As a general comment, we can note that the exchanges took place in the absence of any tension and were generally concluded with enthusiasm.

### On the participation and implication of producers

**The selection of producers and plots is a necessary condition for any successful implementation. However, it must be put in perspective with the scaling-up of the pilot. Indeed, even if the program has reached a satisfactory level of results in the last campaign, it has focused on a restricted number of producers that presented good characteristics for rice production.**

**The producers are willing to be supervised and accompanied during the campaign.** The measures taken to reduce the risk and the uncertainty faced by producers when entering the pilot and taking credit has had a positive return on the willingness to participate.

**At the same time, GICs are asking for further development and empowerment.** The organizations of producers remained relatively weak despite the introduction of the monetary participation requested at the beginning of the season. The presidents of the GICs were in favor of having more responsibilities and decision power.

1. **Carefully define the aimed population**
	1. There exists a trade-off between stricter selection criteria and the number of participants
	2. Credit needs need to be properly established to avoid excess credit adoption.
2. **Implicate the producers and the GICs in the pilot**
	1. The selection of inputs by the producers has been a large success and it may be transposed to other decisions
	2. The GICs asked for further autonomy and reaffirmed their willingness to develop.

### On the selection of PU

**Processing units have faced organizational issues.** This issue had to be addressed through the pilot by providing training to the PU. However, during the implementation, the issues have not solved. A potential solution would be to choose to work with bigger processing units, that are likely to be better organized.

**PU did not properly manage to make a profit.** According to the discussion we had during the workshops, the low proportion of the quantity harvested sold by producers is one of the causes of the difficulty for PU to reach sustainability. Another explanation can be the low quality of the rice produced that affects the transformation rate and the price of sale. Finally, PUs were not able to develop an adequate marketing strategy.

**Payment and repayment results are unsatisfactory.** Because of the issues revealed previously, the PU were unable to pay producers on time nor reimburse their loans obtained from the credit institution. This has led to the restructuring of loans.

To overcome these issues, it appears necessary to better define the business model associated with the PU activities. It is also necessary to improve the management techniques of the PU.

1. **Study the business model associated with the PU activities**
	1. It is necessary to define the training needed by these firms
	2. It is also necessary to estimate the credit needed and the schedule of reimbursement.

### On the funding of the activities

**The credit union has assumed a large share of the financial risk associated with the pilot and had to ask for guarantees.** During the two first years of the implementation, the micro-finance institute has faced low reimbursement rates. In 2021, the micro-finance institute asked for further guarantees and contributions at the obtention of the credit. This last season presents much better reimbursement results among the farmers.

**There exists an informational constraint around credit conditions and banking activities.** The additional services put in place at the beginning of the campaign by the credit union were well received by producers (opening of "blank" accounts, visits to villages, etc.).

1. **Carefully define the condition of attribution and reimbursement of credits.**
	1. The PU should have some flexibility in the use and schedule of reimbursement for their loans.
	2. Producers should be informed about the conditions and risks associated with credit intake. Furthermore, they should not have to rely on informal credit to pay some additional costs.
	3. Transaction costs should be reduced to promote participation in the pilot.

### On the selection of the inputs

**Input quality must be controlled and an agreement with the producers is a possibility.** In the 2020 season, the poor input quality undermined the agricultural results. In 2021, the inputs were chosen in agreement with the GICs and no complaints about quality have been received.

# Monograph: Value chain development in practice – Insights from an application to rice in Western Africa

To conclude this pilot project and to disseminate the learnings we acquired during these 3 years of implementation, we are preparing a monograph. The objective of the monograph is to present the analysis from an academic perspective and the results to be useful for academicals and policymakers. Each chapter frames the challenge, reviews the findings from the literature on how to address it, elaborates on what the pilot did within this context, including insights on private and social returns, and presents the findings from the lessons learned (each time follow the transactions and where it goes wrong/or good). It will retake globally the following outline.

1. Introduction
2. Economics of rice production
3. The mill’s perspective
4. Who provides the credit?
5. Paying for quality: a sustainable idea?
6. Institutions for Coordination
7. Special Topics
8. Lessons for VCD in staples

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# Annexes

## Description of the data collected in 2021

During the three years of the pilot implementation, we have collected a large amount of data.

First, we conducted two censuses of the population in the regions planned to participate in 2019 and 2020 seasons.

Second, we collected administrative data. This data provides information on the farmers participating in the VCD pilot. In 2021, we have 137 participants for which the data has been continuously updated by our local coordinators during the campaign. This data provides a short description of the individual characteristics, the quantities of inputs demanded, and the cost associated with them, information on credit obtaining and the credit cost, and finally information on harvest, sales, and training participation. The format has evolved across seasons and includes substantially more information on this last season of implementation. However, the major agronomical indices are comparable in the three rounds of data.

Finally, we performed large household surveys for each of our seasons. It retakes data about household characteristics, and agricultural practices have prepared a survey covering either participants or non-participants in X villages during the year. This 2021 household survey was completed in 3 waves during the campaign, it covers 456 participants in the three regions of study. Among our 137 participants in the pilot, 134 were surveyed in our household survey.

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|   | Poro | Tchologo | Tonkpi |
| Number of surveyed households | 163/192 | 171/188 | 122/129 |
| *-- non-panel participant* | *23/163* | *14/171* | *21/122* |
| *-- panel participant* | *25/163* | *42/171* | *9/122* |
| *-- non-panel non-participant* | *15/163* | *19/171* | *44/122* |
| *-- panel non-participant* | *75/163* | *78/171* | *42/122* |
| *-- panel desistant* | *25/163* | *18/171* | *6/122* |
| Total size of the panel  | 125/163 | 138/171 | 57/122 |
| Date: 20/04/2022 |  |  |  |

## Location and areas of activities

The Poro region is found in the extreme north of the country. Its climate is very hot and dry (Sudanese type of climate). It has two main seasons (dry and rainy) and a "savannah tree" type of vegetation.

The great dry season (November-May) within December and January, the harmattan, a violent and dry wind coming from the Sahara which, sometimes blows rather strongly carrying sand and drying everything on its way and decreasing considerably the temperature.

The rainy season is intense and extends from May to the end of October with an interruption in August and September. The rainy season is the one during which cultivation operations do not leave the farmers any rest, as all the crops must be planted.

Farmers in the region are "poly or multi-cultivators" of perennial crops (cashew, cotton, mango, etc.) and food crops (maize, millet, sorghum, rice, groundnuts, etc.).

Rice is grown in the uplands as rainfed rice and in the lowlands. In the valleys, there are flooded rice fields that producers use for lowland cultivation as well. All heads of households grow rice (upland or lowland) to ensure family consumption of rice first, and then to sell some of it. However, as managed lowland plots are rare, producers are generally sought after for subsidy programs and are therefore less interested in taking on debt.

Thus, for the 2021 campaign, we worked in 07 localities (Kouniguekaha, Loyerikaha, Kiéré, Kanoroba, Pitiangomon, Dikodougou and Napié) spread over two departments, Korhogo and Dikodougou. Of the 7 localities, only one (NAPIE) has a dam and a developed site. Rice cultivation in the other 06 localities depends on rainfall and the sites are not developed, hence the very high risks.



The Tchologo, a region located in the north of Côte d'Ivoire, is an administrative district and a territorial collectivity whose capital is the town of Ferkessédougou. This region includes the departments of Ferkessédougou, Kong, Ouangolodougou, Diawala and Nielle.

The region is located in the sub-Sudanese savannah zone, whose northern limit is a line including the territories of Odienné, Boundiali, Ferkessédougou and Bouna. The climate is Sudano-Guinean with two seasons, while the vegetation, depending on the level of agricultural pressure, is characteristic of the tree savannah, the wooded savannah or the shrub savannah.

The rural populations of the region are mainly engaged in agriculture and/or livestock rearing. They grow food crops, in particular yams, maize, rice, groundnuts, millet, sorghum, sweet potatoes, cowpeas and fonio; annual cash crops, in particular, cotton, tobacco, soybeans, various vegetable crops and sugar cane; and perennial cash crops, in particular mangoes, avocados, citrus fruits and cashew nuts.

Livestock production includes cattle, goats, pigs, sheep and poultry, as well as fish and bee farming. The region is a major producer of vegetables, rice and maize, in terms of food crops. It also produces cotton, cashew nuts and sugar for local consumption and export.

Cotton and cashew producers are grouped together in the “Union des producteurs de coton et d'anacarde de la région du Tchologo”.



Tonkpi is a region (administrative district and territorial collectivity) located in the west of Côte d'Ivoire. Its capital is Man.

It is part of the District of the Mountains and includes the departments of Biankouma, Danané, Man, Sipilou and Zouan-Hounien.

In the Tonkpi Region, the series of low plateaus is linked in places with very uneven areas with contours varying between average slopes and altitudes sometimes exceeding 1,000 m. Most of the steep and fractured mountain slopes and the deep valleys are exposed to a high risk of erosion. Ferrallitic soils of medium chemical fertility are dominant and generally have little vegetation cover.

As in most parts of the country, the local economy is based on agriculture with a relatively diversified crop and livestock production. The region produces various export crops, in particular coffee, cocoa, rubber and oil palm, but also numerous food crops including rice, cassava, plantain and maize. Livestock farming is practised in the area and involves cattle, goats and sheep. The agricultural potential remains important with diversified ecologies including mountainous areas, plains, plateaus and lowlands offering a variety of cultivation possibilities. The rainfall varies between 1,300 and 2,400 mm per year and is largely favourable to agriculture. The same applies to the relatively dense hydrographic network.



## Insights about factors impacting project performance from villages

The restricted number of participating villages in 2021 allowed more extensive work on the village specific context. The village presentations were provided by the local coordinators directly on the field in French. We selected two villages per region that present different approaches and reactions to the program.

**Poro – Kiéré**

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| Situé dans la sous-préfecture de KANOROBA, Kiéré est à 97 Km de Korhogo, chef-lieu de Région. C’est une localité très excentrée. Ce village dispose de plusieurs atouts naturels tels que les cours d’eau favorisant la culture du riz de bas-fond. Il possède de grands blocs de bas-fonds et très propices à la riziculture. Les participants ont des superficies individuelles considérables (1ha et plus) de bas-fond pour la plupart d’entre eux. Et aucun des bas-fonds n’est aménagé. Les producteurs cultivent beaucoup le riz de plateau. Cette activité leur permet de couvrir le besoin de l’autoconsommation familiale en riz. Ainsi, pour la majorité, le riz du projet est plus dédié à la commercialisation.Selon les paysans, c’est leur toute première fois de bénéficier d’encadrement et de formation dans la production de riz. Ils sont très motivés et engagés pour le projet car pour eux le projet présente plusieurs opportunités qui sont :* la qualité des intrants,
* la livraison des intrants au village,
* les formations et le suivi des producteurs,
* le prix intéressants d’achat du riz paddy à la récolte.

Le projet est ses deux premières campagnes (2020 et 2021). Le nombre des participants est passé de 04 en 2020 à 13 pour la campagne 2021. L’une des forces du village est la forte motivation du président de GIC (le président de l’inter-GIC du Poro). Les membres sont beaucoup motivés et engagés dans le projet. Ils sont toujours disponibles et mobilisés pour les activités du projet et mettre en pratique les conseils et recommandations du consortium local. Malgré le fait que 69% des participants de la campagne 2021 sont des nouveaux producteurs et n’avaient aucune formation dans la riziculture de bas-fond, Kiéré a fait un rendement moyen de 2,726 t/ha. Il aurait dépassé cette performance. Mais, certains producteurs ont beaucoup souffert de l’inondation après la mise en place. Ils ont eu le courage de reprendre le semis. Par contre, 1 ou 2 producteurs ont connu l’échec pour cette campagne et n’ont pas repris les activités sur leur parcelle respective.Ils ont récolté 29,051 t de riz paddy et en ont vendus 15,524 t à l’UT. Soit un taux de commercialisation de 53,44%. Ils doutaient beaucoup sur la fiabilité du respect du délai de paiement. Sinon, ils auraient dépassé ce taux de commercialisation. Car par expérience, pour la campagne 2020, ils ont souffert en faisant plusieurs tours à la COOPEC avant d’être payés. Or la majorité avait besoin de cet argent pour organiser les fêtes de fin d’année. Sur un effectif de 13 participants, 09 ont été solvables. Soit un taux de remboursement de 69,23% du crédit COOPEC. 04 producteurs sont en impayés.Concernant la disponibilité de matériel d’agricole, ils bénéficient de pulvérisateurs et de bœufs à travers les structures cotonnières pour leur opération de labour et autres activités. Ils ont accès à des batteuses appartenant à certains producteurs du village. Ces derniers font du battage mécanique une de leur activité principale saisonnière. En effet, cette méthode mécanisée intéresse de plus en plus les producteurs de riz. La majorité de nos producteurs ont fait le battage mécanique et ont fait plusieurs vannages dans l’optique de bénéficier de la prime qualité. Le seul problème qu’ils ont évoqué au niveau du battage, c’est le manque d’argent cash pour le règlement de facture après le battage.De façon générale, le paddy de Kiéré était de bonne qualité en thème de taux d’humidité, fermentation et pureté. Il est l’un des villages où la majorité des producteurs a bénéficié de la prime qualité de riz paddy.Les producteurs ont apprécié beaucoup le contrat de production avec l’UT car le prix d’achat à la récolte est beaucoup plus intéressant que celui du marché local.Comme difficultés de Kiéré, le village est très loin du chef-lieu de Région (Korhogo) et les sites rizicoles sont éloignés du village. En plus de cela, les bénéficiaires sont beaucoup dispersés sur des différents blocs de bas-fond. Nous avons constaté aussi la présence de bœufs en divagation dans les bas-fonds qui ne sont pas aménagés ni clôturés.Il y a une opportunité de mettre le projet à l’échelle dans cette localité car les responsables de GIC et des membres, en plus les villages voisins, attendent. Le président du GICs nous a rassuré que l’effectif des participants sera doublé pour la campagne 2022 car ils sont très convaincus maintenant que la culture est rentable et bénéfique. |

**Poro – Pitiengomon**

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| Situé dans sous-préfecture de Niofoin, Pitiangomon est à environ 84 km de Korhogo, chef-lieu de Région et 24 km de ladite sous-préfecture. Bénéficiant de plusieurs cours d’eau aux alentours du village, la population de Pitiangomon pratique la culture du riz de bas-fond pluviale de façon traditionnel. Les paysans sont de grands cultivateurs de plateau à travers la culture du coton, l’anacardier, le riz plateau, l’arachide, et le maïs. Les producteurs ont d’importantes superficies de riz de plateau et de bas-fond qui leurs permettent de dissocier les parcelles de riz pour l’autoconsommation et le riz projet destiné à la commercialisation. Il y a du potentiel cultural pour le riz de bas-fond cette localité. Mais, les autres producteurs sont en phase d’observation. Ils sont en attente pour voir si les participants ou débutants seront satisfaits. Le projet est vraiment strict sur le respect de l’itinéraire technique notamment le mode et le délai d’utilisation des intrants. Ce qui freine l’adhésion des producteurs, surtout le mode de semis en poquet et en ligne.Ce village est à sa deuxième année de participation du projet. Dans la campagne 2020, le village a participé avec 07 producteurs et les responsables de GICs nous avaient rassuré que le nombre allait augmenter considérablement en 2021. Mais à cause des intrants non adaptés en 2020 ou mauvaise qualité des intrants et les impayés de la COOPEC, seulement 04 producteurs, dont 2 anciens et 2 nouveaux, ont pu y participer.Pour cette campagne 2021, Pitiangomon a fait une production totale de 10,894 t de riz paddy et en a vendu 7,725 t. Soit un taux de commercialisation de 70,91%. Ils doutaient beaucoup sur la fiabilité du respect du délai de paiement. Car par expérience, pour la campagne 2020, ils n’ont pas été payés à temps par la COOPEC. Or, la majorité avait besoin de cet argent pour organiser les fêtes de fin d’année. Tous les producteurs ont remboursé le crédit intrants de la COOPEC.Tous les membres du GIC ont des bœufs de culture attelée (BCA) pour faire les opérations de labour et de petits matériels. Les membres de leur famille respective (femmes, enfants, frères …) constituent la main d’œuvre permanente pour les autres activités plus précisément celles des récoltes. Il y a des batteuses dans le village pour battre le riz après la récolte. Mais, le plus souvent les producteurs ne disposent pas d’argent en espèce pour régler les frais de battage. C’est ce qui pousse certains à vendre une partie de leur production pour honorer ces engagements si les opérations commerciales sont faites en retard. Ce qui fait la force de ce village, c’est la disponibilité du président de GIC ainsi que ces membres. Ils sont toujours mobilisés pour toutes les activités. Ils s’intéressent beaucoup à la culture de riz de bas-fond et aux activités du projet et mettent en œuvre les conseils et recommandations des membres du consortium local. Des possibilités de mettre le projet à l’échelle dans cette localité existe, mais il faut une bonne stratégie de sensibilisation et communication des paysans et étendre le projet aux villages environnants. |

**Poro – Summary**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Village** | **Kouniguekaha** | **Loyerikaha** | **Kiéré** | **Kanoroba** | **Pitiangomon** | **Dikodougou** | **Napie** |
|  |
| **Distance to the region capital (km)** | 27 | 15 | 97 | 90 | 84 | 50 | 16 |  |
| **Number of producers**  | 4 | 4 | 13 | 11 | 4 | 6 | 5 |  |
| **Surface (ha)** | 3.7 | 2.26 | 15.2 | 4.3 | 5.1 | 3.75 | 2.16 |  |
| **Harvest (kg)** | 10,897 | 4,584 | 29,051 | 5,711 | 10,894 | 10,361 | 3,621 |  |
| **Yields (t/ha)** | 2.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 1.3 | 2.1 | 2.8 | 1.7 |  |
| **Managed Lowland** | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |  |
| **Mechanical threshing** | No | Developing | Yes | - | Yes | - | - |  |
| **Other activities** | Food crops | Cotton | - | Cashew, mango, cotton, livestock. | Cashew, | Cotton, Cashew, | Outside agriculture |  |
| Cotton, | Mais... |  |
| Cash crops... |   |  |
| **Comment** | High level of motivation among participants | Few motivations of producers. | High motivation | There is a large program competition, the possibility to work with close localities | Pilot sceptical | Lack of interest. | 2 cycles of rice cultivation are possible |  |
| **Scaling-up possibility** | Yes, but must be well designed. | No | Yes | Yes | Yes, but must be well designed. | Yes, but not convincing | No, do no follow the pilot’s idea |  |

**Tchologo – Koussorokaha**

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| Koussorokaha est l’un des villages de la Sous-préfecture de ferké. Il est situé à 15 km au Nord-Est du chef-lieu de région. C’est un village qui a bénéficié du projet Filets Socio productif de 2017 à 2020.Aussi, cette localité bénéficie d’un des plus grands périmètres aménagés de la région des Savanes avec une superficie de plus de 300 ha. Cet ouvrage a été réalisé en 1972 par la SODERIZ (Société de Développement de la Riziculture). Il dessert en amont jusqu’en aval, 05 villages. A savoir, Koussorokaha, Doulovogo, Nawovogo, Dékokaha et Ferké ville.Cet ouvrage est un atout pour la réalisation de deux (02) cycles de production de paddy par an : (Décembre - Avril et Mai - Octobre). Selon les producteurs de ce périmètre, la production du riz du premier cycle est beaucoup plus sécurisée contre les éventuels chocs par rapport au deuxième cycle (inondations, les sécheresses sévères de certaines années).Les producteurs de ce périmètre ont eu l’avantage de participer aux lancements de plusieurs projets sur ce site. Tels que :Projet de PROPACOM (Projet d’Appui à la Production Agricole et à la Commercialisation) qui a financé les Producteurs en intrants.ONDR (Office National de Développement de la Riziculture) qui a financé les producteurs en intrants.Projets de recherches de multiplication de semences par le CNRA (Centre National de recherche Agronomiques) AFRICA RICE pour la formation et la production de plusieurs variétés de semences de la Coopérative des Semenciers du Tchologo.ANADER (Agence National d’Appui au Développement Rural), formation des producteurs sur l’itinéraire Technique du Riz. Avec tout récemment, le projet de « post crise de COVID » lancé par l’état et piloté par le Leader de Pool, SOCOM-CI. Et bien d’autres Projets.Ces riverains ont bénéficié de bonnes doses de formations pratiques de production de riz.Sur l’ensemble des cinq (05) villages desservis par le barrage de Koussorokaha, deux (02) ont participé au projet d’inclusion Economique des Bénéficiaires du Projet Filets Sociaux dans La Filière Riz (Koussorokaha et Dékokaha)Seulement Koussorokaha a pris part aux trois campagnes qui viennent de se dérouler. La seule participation de Dékokaha en 2019 était de 07 producteurs avec une superficie de 6,14 ha car ils ont trouvé que le projet présentait trop d’exigences (ouverture de compte, coût élevé, recouvrement de créances). A ce jour, certains producteurs sollicitent réintégrer le projet du fait qu’ils n’avaient pas bien cerné les contours du projet vu qu’ils avaient un esprit de gratuité. Pour Koussorokaha, en 2019 la participation fut de 14 producteurs pour une superficie totale déclarée de 15 ha. La superficie mesurée était de 13,29 ha avec une superficie moyenne de 0,9 ha/participant.En 2020, 07 producteurs de Koussorokaha étaient inscrits au projet Pilote avec une superficie déclarée de 5,52 ha. Enfin de compte, 03 ont participé avec une superficie mesurée de 3,07 ha. Les raisons de cette faible participation sont :La mauvaise qualité des intrantsLes impayés de la campagne 2019L’arrêt brutal des pluies en Septembre 2020 à occasion de grandes pertes sur l’ensemble de toutes les productions. Pour un engagement initialement prévue de 6 140 kg de livraison, 5 145 kg ont été livré à l’UT.Sur ce périmètre, tous les Producteurs sont habitués au repiquage exclusif du riz. Pendant la période de commercialisation du paddy, l’UT est concurrencé par les Acheteurs qui viennent de l’intérieur du pays avec un prix d’achat intéressant et concurrentiels à ceux de l’UT (de 180 à 200f/kg), le paiement trop tard des producteurs qui ont réalisé des soldes positifs.Les différentes spéculations qu’on trouve sur ce périmètre sont :A la petite saison : les cultures maraichères, la production du premier cycle du riz.A la grande saison : les céréales, les maraîchers et le riz du deuxième cycle.Pour cette campagne 2021, 02 producteurs étaient en impayés du fait d’inondation qui a beaucoup perturbé leur production. 01 seul a pu rembourser à la COOPEC et l’autre a pris l’engagement pour fin Mars 2022.La possibilité de mettre à l’échelle ces riverains est une chance du fait de la potentialité de production de cette zone. En plus, les différents villages qui restent manifestent un intérêt de participation au projet. |

**Tchologo – Quartier Douane**

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| Le GIC du Quartier Douane est un regroupement des Producteurs existants dans la Commune de Ferké ville. Ceux-ci ont manifesté un intérêt de produire le riz dans la mise en œuvre du projet dès la première campagne pilote. Le nombre de producteurs aurait pu s’accroitre du fait qu’un certain nombre de producteurs souhaitait participer au dit projet mais le Comité avait déjà bouclé l’identification et la mesure des parcelles. Cette localité ne bénéficie pas des transferts monétaires de la Banque Mondiale (Filets Socio Productif).C’est donc à la deuxième campagne pilote que 11 Producteurs ont été intégré au Projet pour crée le GIC du Quartier Douane du fait que les premières démarches venaient de ce quartier. Pour la campagne 2020, ce GIC a regroupé donc des producteurs un peu de tous les quartiers de la ville avec des sites de productions diverses autour de la ville. Il est à reconnaitre que les membres de ce GIC utilisent beaucoup la prestation mécanisée du fait de la disponibilité de cette prestation en ville (labour mécanisé, les Coopératives de femmes pour les repiquages et les batteuses…).Ces zones de production dont bénéficient ces producteurs sont assez riches du fait de leur proximité de la ville (à base de fumier et de déchets organiques). Les terres exploitées par ce GIC sont légué (don) aux producteurs qui ne sont pas forcément les propriétaires terriens. Du jour au lendemain, ils peuvent quitter ces lieux sous la demande des propriétaires terriens. Il faut reconnaitre que ces sites sont à risques du fait :* des inondations,
* de faibles pluviométries fréquentes empêchant la croissance normale de la plante,
* de destructions de cultures par les animaux domestiques.
* De l’extension de la ville par des nouveaux lotissements de la ville.

 Pour cette première participation, ils ont vu leur joie se fondre en désespoir du fait de la qualité des intrants de 2020 qu’ils ont trouvé inefficace. Avec un nombre de 11 producteurs déclarés pour une superficie de 8,76 ha soit 0,80 ha par participant, 02 ont désisté après mesure des parcelles. La superficie mesurée était de 7,59 ha soit 0,69 ha par producteurs. En ce qui concerne la mauvaise production de 2020 liée à une longue sécheresse, la qualité des intrants, la production s’élevait à 8 115 kg avec un rendement moyen de 1 264 kg/ha.Sur un remboursement de paddy de 15 520 kg à l’UT, 4 223 kg ont été livré soit un taux de remboursement de 27% a été réalisé en 2020. Les difficultés liées à ce faible taux de remboursement ont été citées plus hauts. Les impayés des membres de ce GIC ont été payés à la COOPEC à l’exception d’un seul producteur.Pour cette campagne 2021, nous avons eu encore une forte participation de ce GIC avec 07 producteurs de 2020 du fait de leur intérêt qu’ils portent au projet. La superficie déclarée par ces 07 était de 8,53 ha soit une moyenne de 1,22 ha/participant. Vu la sélection strict du GIC, certains anciens n’ont pas été retenu. Ce GIC comme ceux de Koussorokaha et Nambonkaha est très expérimenté à la production du riz et la mise en œuvre des bonnes pratiques agricoles. Ils ont acquis des expériences par des formations qu’ils ont reçues à travers plusieurs projets sur le périmètre de Koussorokaha. Le rendement moyen s’élevait à 1 901 kg/participant sur une récolte globale de 16 613,5 kg sur l’ensemble du GIC, soit une moyenne de production de 2 373 kg/producteur. Ce GIC a livré 5 627 kg à l’UT sur un engagement attendu de 4 189 kg, soit un taux de réalisation de 134%. Bien que cette quantité vendue paraisse intéressante, elle représente un faible taux de 34% de la production totale livrée. Sur les 02 producteurs en impayés, 01 a déjà soldé son compte à la COOPEC. Le dernier a promis passer jusqu’à la fin du mois de mars 2022.Les raisons de ces faibles rendements de ce GIC s’expliquent par:* les inondations de longues périodes qui ont immergés les jeunes plants repiqués
* Les dégâts des animaux sur certaines parcelles.

Ces différentes raisons ont eu un impact fort sur les rendements.Pour les faibles ventes, des explications ont été révélées telles que :* La consommation familiale
* Le faible prix d’achat de l’UT
* Les épargnes en nature (paddy) importantes qui sont rationnellement utilisés sur le long de l’année pour combler d’autres charges liées soit à la famille ou à servir pour des fonds de solidarité communautaire.
* Le règlement tardif des soldes positifs par la COOPEC qui crée souvent une impatience des producteurs.

Il y a une forte chance de mettre ce village à l’échelle du projet car il y a un intérêt manifesté par ce GIC et de nouveaux producteurs à venir dans ce projet. |

**Tchologo – Summary**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Village** | **Koussorokaha** | **Nambonkaha** | **Quartier Douane** | **Séfognekaha** | **Sodesucre V3** | **Sodesucre Extension** | **Sokoro 2** |
|  |
| **Distance to the region capital (km)** | 15 | 15 | 0 | - | - | 42 | 5 |  |
| **Number of producers**  | - | - | 7 | 5 | 11 | 12 | 10 |  |
| **Surface (ha)** | 6 | 3.54 | 8.53 | 2.93 | 6.93 | 10.45 | 6.04 |  |
| **Harvest (kg)** | 13,596 | 10,162 | 16,613 | 3,120 | 17,611 | 32,044 | 6,117 |  |
| **Yields (kg/ha)** | 2.1 | 2.8 | 1.9 | 1.1 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.1 |  |
| **Managed Lowland** | Yes | - | - | - | - | - | - |  |
| **Mechanical threshing** | - | Yes  | - | - | - | - | - |  |
| **Other activities** | - | Diverse cash and food crops  | - | Cash crops (cotton, mangoes)  | sugar cane | sugar cane | sugar cane |  |
|  |
|  |
| **Commentary** | 2 cycles of rice cultivation are possible. Many programs have been implemented.  | They have other markets opportunity at a higher price  | The plots are lent for free to the producers  | Lack of interest, rice is an optional activity for them.  | Large rice experience  | 2 cycles of rice cultivation are possible. Competition in the rice market  | Experienced producers  |  |
| **Scaling-up possibility** | Yes | Yes  | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes  |  |

**Tonkpi – Mahapleu**

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| Mahapleu est une Sous-préfecture située à 46 km de Man sur l’axe Man – Danané. Cette localité est reconnue comme l’une des grandes zones productrices de riz de la région du Tonkpi. Mahapleu a bénéficié de plusieurs projets avec les organismes étatiques et privés. Cette localité bénéficie d’un écosystème déjà favorable à la riziculture commerciale. Il existe de grands bas-fonds aménagés sur plusieurs blocs et facilement accessible à des engins de 4 roues. Il existe plusieurs groupements de producteurs pour différentes cultures (cacao, riz…) dans la zone.Pour la campagne 2021, 7 producteurs se sont engagés dans le projet pour une superficie totale de 14,42 ha déclarée au départ, soit en moyenne 2,2 ha/participant. Le président du GIC a été très sélectif pour éviter l’échec du premier essai du projet dans leur village. Il n’a donc pas divulgué l’information à tous les producteurs dans la localité. De plus, plusieurs des producteurs qui avaient été présélectionnés, n’ont pas pu ouvrir les comptes et déposer la garantie à temps auprès de la COOPEC. Suite à des problèmes d’indisponibilité de motoculteur et de moyen financier pour la garantie, les superficies déclarées ont été réduites à 8,54 ha au total, soit environ 1,22 ha/participant.Les producteurs du GIC de Mahapleu sont tous très expérimentés dans la culture du riz de bas-fond et dans la mise en œuvre des bonnes pratiques rizicoles. Ils ont acquis ces expériences de par les formations qu’ils ont reçu à travers les différents projets auxquels ils ont participé tels que le projet sur la multiplication des semences avec le CNRA (Centre National de Recherche Agronomique) et des projets avec le leader de pôle ORIANE. De plus, certains parmi ces producteurs exercent d’autres activités hors exploitation telles que le commerce, le transport et possèdent des plantations de café-cacao.Cette bonne expérience s’est matérialisée à travers les performances qu’a réalisé le GIC de Mahapleu pour cette campagne rizicole 2021. En effet, les rendements moyens s’élevaient à 3,2 tonnes/participant avec une récolte totale de 25,1 tonnes, soit en moyenne 3,5 tonnes/participant. Le GIC a livré 8528 kg de paddy à l’UT sur 9300 kg attendus, soit un taux de réalisation de 92%. Cette quantité vendue correspond à 34% de leur production totale. Les raisons de cette faible proportion vendue sont de 3 types :* Le remboursement du crédit informel. En effet, compte tenu de la rareté de main d’œuvre et du manque de moyen financier pendant les principales opérations culturales (labour, repiquage, battage…) du fait de la concurrence des autres cultures, certains producteurs ont recours à des crédits avec des particuliers qui exigent le remboursement en paddy.
* Les charges familiales. Certains producteurs ont à charges la famille de leur défunt parent et/ou de la belle famille.
* Le prix du paddy jugé bas.

Cependant, le handicap principal de la localité de Mahapleu est le manque de machine pour le battage et le labour. La demande pour ces 2 prestations est très forte à Mahapleu, cependant, 1 seul prestataire situé à Man est disponible pour répondre à cette demande. Les capacités de prestation de ce dernier sont en deçà de la demande. Cette situation a entrainé la dégradation de la qualité du paddy vendu par le GIC de Mahapleu, surtout au niveau de l’humidité (paddy trop sec).Il existe d’énormes possibilités de mettre le projet à l’échelle dans le village de Mahapleu. D’ailleurs, plusieurs producteurs hors projet ont manifesté leur intérêt à participer au projet la campagne prochaine auprès du GIC. |

**Tonkpi - Logoualé**

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| Logoualé est une sous-préfecture qui s’étend sur une superficie de 1824 km2 et se situe à environ 538 km d’Abidjan et à 32 km du chef-lieu qui est la ville de Man. Logoualé se situe en bordure de l’axe principale Man - Abidjan et est pratiquement confondu à la ville. De ce fait, cette localité dispose d’un marché de riz blanc.Pour cette campagne 2021, il y a eu seulement 2 producteurs qui se sont engagés dans le projet pour 3 raisons principales selon nos observations :* Certains producteurs avaient contracté des prêts avec la COOPEC qu’ils n’avaient pas encore remboursés.
* La plupart des producteurs de la zone n’ont vraiment pas besoin du crédit pour avoir accès aux intrants car ils ont des moyens financiers pour cela. Ces producteurs ont des activités secondaires : commerçant, champs de café-cacao et hévéa, réparateurs de machines et d’appareils de télécommunications… De plus, les bas-fonds de cette localité sont très riches. Ainsi, certains producteurs n’utilisent pas ou réduisent la quantités d’engrais utilisée sur les parcelles.
* Ces producteurs sont exposés à des prix de paddy beaucoup plus intéressants que celui du projet du fait de la position géographique et du désenclavement de leur localité. Toutes les unités de transformations dans la ville et autours (Duékoué, Bangolo, Guiglo…) s’y rendent pour les achats de paddy à des prix élevés que celui du projet (pas de coût de transport de la ville au village).

Cette localité bénéficie de grands bas-fond aménagé depuis plusieurs années par des structures étatiques où il est possible de faire 2 cycles (plusieurs producteurs dans la zone font 2 cycles). Mais la plupart des producteurs du projet loue ces parcelles. Les producteurs de Logoualé ont réalisé une performance de 2,5 tonnes/ha pour cette campagne 2021. Ce résultat satisfaisant pourrait s’explique par le fait que ces producteurs sont assez expérimentés dans la production du riz de bas-fond et adoptaient déjà quelques bonnes pratiques agricoles telles que le repiquage. Cependant, ces producteurs ont récolté 1438 kg de paddy et vendu 796 kg soit 55% de la production totale. 2 raisons pourraient expliquer ce fait :* Les superficies repiquées ont été réduites à cause de l’inondation des parcelles. En effet, les bas-fonds sont proches du cours d’eau principal de la région appelé en langue locale « KÔ » qui déborde lors des grandes saisons de pluie ou lorsque les pluies fortes se succèdent.
* La consommation familiale.

Le passage à l’échelle dans ce village nécessite de bonne sensibilisation de la part du GIC qui pourrait mieux communiquer avec leur producteur. |

**Tonkpi – Summary**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Village** | **Logoualé** | **Dinégouine** | **Goziogouiné 1**  | **Douélé** | **Mahapleu** | **Zouan-hounien** |
|  |
| **Distance to the region capital (km)** | 32 | 37 | 29 | 19 | 46 | 133 |  |
| **Number of producers**  | 2 | 8 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 6 |  |
| **Surface (ha)** | 0.6 | 7.24 | 1.36 | 0.8 | 8.54 | 13.02 |  |
| **Harvest (kg)** | 1,438 | 21,322 | 2,898 | 6,790 | 25,141 | 33,288 |  |
| **Yields (t/ha)** | 2.5 | 3 | 2.1 | 3.8 | 3.2 | 2.7 |  |
| **Managed Lowland** | - | Yes | No | - | - | Yes  |  |
| **Mechanical threshing** | - | - |   | - | No, high demand and low supply  | Yes  |  |
| **Other activities** | - | - | Coffee, Cacao  | - |   | Gold mine  |  |
| - |  |
|   |  |
| **Commentary** | - | - | - | Reimbursment of lending of the plot is made in rice. High motivation of participants | Reimbursment of informal credit  | They have other markets opportunity at higher price  |  |
| **Scaling-up possibility** | - | - | - | No | Yes  | Yes, but must be well designed |  |

## Tables:

## Season 2021 by region (Data from March 2022)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Poro | Tchologo | Tonkpi |
| **Participation** |
| Total of villages  | 7(6/2) | 7(6/2) | 6(3/0) |
| Number of villages beneficiaries of PFSP | 2(1/1) | 3(2/2) | 0 |
| Number of producers | 48(14/6) | 58(38/5) | 31(9/0) |
| Number of producers beneficiaries of PFSP | 3(1/3) | 10(7/5) | 0 |
| **Engagements contractuels, quantités livrées de riz paddy et quantités récoltées** |
| Total surface (ha) | 24,1 | 44,6 | 32,6 |
| Average surface (ha) | 0,5 | 0,8 | 1,0 |
| Contractual rice engagement (t) | 44,4 | 37,9 | 42,4 |
| Total rice harvested (t) | 78,1 | 110,2 | 90,9 |
| Total rice sold (t) | 40,4 | 50,0 | 33,8 |
| Average yield (kg/ha) including zeros | 2 692 | 2 523 | 3 028 |
| Average yield (kg/ha) excluding zeros | 2 749 | 2 661 | 3 028 |
| Rice price per variety in FCFA/kg (B-AM/JT11/C26) | -/165/165 | 140/165/165 | 150/150/- |
| Total credit (million FCFA) | 3,4 | 5,8 | 4,7 |
| Average credit per producer (FCFA) | 87 690 | 99 404 | 153 089 |
| Total cost of credit per producer (FCFA) | 534 892 | 1 357 575 | 523 376 |
| Average cost of credit per producer (FCFA) | 13 715 | 23 406 | 16 883 |
| Number of producers having reimbursed  | 32/39 | 51/58 | 29/31 |
| Average amount of positive balances in COOPEC (FCFA) | 95 374 | 61 978 | 25 550 |
| Average amount of negative balances in COOPEC (FCFA) | 30 473 | 60 523 | 79 382 |

### Regional actors

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Coordinating Region | Year | Village | Region | PU serving the village | Location PU | COOPEC Branch |
| Tonkpi | 2019 | Tous | Tonkpi | PU Tonkpi 1 | Man | Man |
| 2020 | Tous | PU Tonkpi 2 | Guiglo | Man |
| 2021 | DOUELE, GOZIOGOUINE 1, LOGOUALE, DINEGOUINE | Man |
| Zouan-Hounien | Zouan-Hounien |
| Mahapleu | Danané |
| Tchologo | 2019 | Fodonkaha, Baralokaha, Kpongbokaha, Lavagakaha, Odiekaha, Yebehouignonkaha | Poro | PU Tchologo | Korhogo | Ferkesedougou |
| All the rest | Tchologo |
| 2020 | Fodonkaha | Poro |
| All the rest | Tchologo |
| 2021 | Sodesucre Village 3 et Sodesucre Extension | Hambol |
| All the rest  | Tchologo |
| Poro | 2019 | All | Poro | PU Poro 1 | Korhogo | Korhogo |
| 2020 | PU Poro 1 / PU Poro 2 |
| 2021 | PU Tchologo / UT Poro 1 |

### Etude sur les évolutions des prix au cours des saisons

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **PU** | **Qualité du paddy** | **November to February:** abundance of rice in regions | **March to July:** rice scarcity in the regions | **Commercial target of the PU** |
| **Price of semi-luxury rice (in FCFA/kg)** | **Price of luxury rice (in FCFA/kg)** | **Price of semi-luxury rice (in FCFA/kg)** | **Price of luxury rice (in FCFA/kg)** |
| Tonkpi | Good quality | 260 - 300 | 300 - 325 | 300 - 415 | 400 – 450 | * **Small and large distributors** (Tonkpi and Guémon regions (West of Côte d'Ivoire))
 |
| Medium quality  | 230 - 265 | 275 - 280 | 260 - 400 | 375 - 450 |
| Tchologo-Poro | Good quality | 290 - 310 | 290 – 330 (Almost never sold at this time) | 320-360 | 400-450 | **- Direct consumers****- Small and large distributors (**Poro, Tchologo)**- Companies in Abidjan**  |
| Medium quality  | 230 - 275 | 265 – 280(Almost never sold at this time) | 300 - 340 | 360 - 400 |
| Notes : National Coordinator**Good quality**: +75% long grain, clean and homogeneous in colour**Average quality**: +50% shrivelling, slightly impure and not very homogeneous (not cumulative)**Semi-luxury rice**: Bouaké AM, Wita 9...**Luxury rice:** JT11, C26, CY2... |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Types** | **Units** | **Unit costs** | **Quantities** | **Credit requested from COOPEC** |
| Seeds Bouaké AM / | kg | 525 | 40 | 21 000 |
| Seeds C26 |
| Seeds JT11 |
| Total herbicide (GLYPHALM 360) | litre | 1 850 | 4 | 7 400 |
| Selective post-emergence herbicide specific to rice (RICER) | 200 ml | 4 600 | 4 | 18 400 |
| Insecticide (Lambacyalotrin) | Litre | 3 500 | 3 | 10 500 |
| NPK Activa fertilizer | 50 kg bag | 16 000 | 3 | 48 000 |
| Urea (46%N) | 50 kg bag | 16 000 | 1 | 16 000 |
| Spayers (15 l) | Units | 10 000 |  |  |
| Sickles | Units | 1 000 |  |  |
| Total credit requested (a) | 121 300 |
| COOPEC interest (1% monthly over 6 months) (b) | 7 278 |
| Death insurance (1% per year) (c) | 1213 |
| Application fee (1.5%) (d) | 1820 |
| Guarantee (10%) (e) | 12 130 |
| Management fee (1300 per month) (f) | 7 800 |
| Total amount to be repaid (g=a+b+f-e) | **124 248** (old producers)**116 448** (new producers) |

1. The 2019 rice campaign progress report can be accessed under the following link: <https://www.jobsanddevelopment.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/C%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99Ivoire-Economic-Inclusion-into-Value-Chains-2019-Progress-Report-English.pdf>

The 2020 rice campaign progress report will be made accessible under request. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Put differently, it simultaneously addresses labor supply and demand-side constraints. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Urban rice consumption is growing rapidly in Côte d’Ivoire, with imports filling at least half of the gap. On the other hand, rice is also widely grown in northern Côte d’Ivoire, including by the cash transfer beneficiaries, though mainly for auto-consumption. Preparatory analysis of the rice market suggests that domestic rice production could be competitive with imported rice given sustained technical support and access to finance along the chain to meet the volume and quality requirements of the urban consumers. It is considered a strategic crop by the Ivoirian authorities, which the COVID crisis has only underscored. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)